Russia is being “expelled” from Syria

A few years ago, Bashar al-Assad, whose downfall seemed inevitable, shifted Syria's national interests toward Russia and Iran in an effort to prolong his hold on power and for other personal reasons. Iran turned Syria into a military arena for its own interests, while Russia intervened in the Syrian conflict in 2015 at Assad's request. Russia managed to secure a 49-year lease on the Mediterranean port of Tartus in exchange for keeping Assad in power. However, recent developments, including a coup in Syria a month and a half ago, have dramatically changed the dynamics. It now appears likely that Russia will begin its "demobilization" in Syria, starting with the port of Tartus, which is considered its most strategically important facility in the country. Under the leadership of Jolani, Syria seems to be moving toward building a truly independent state, particularly by suspending or expelling foreign military bases. This article will explore the significance of the port of Tartus, Russia's interests there, and the factors that may have influenced the new government's decision.

Hesitant decision

Following the significant political events in Syria at the end of last year, particularly on December 8, a number of critical questions arose for Jolani, who played a central role in these developments. One of the key issues was the future of the Russian Hmeimim military base, which had served as a "safety cushion" for the fleeing Assad regime, and the port of Tartus, which holds political, economic, and military significance. Jolani emphasized that Russia remains an important strategic partner for Syria. He indicated that the future of Syria’s transitional government and Russia’s political and military involvement would be determined through negotiations between the two sides. At first glance, it seemed that the Kremlin still had a chance, and the situation appeared stable. Even on December 12, 2024, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov expressed hope that Russia would retain its military presence in Syria despite the new government taking power.

However, on January 21, the new Syrian government made a surprising move by canceling the agreement that had granted Russia a long-term military presence in the Mediterranean. Riyadh Judi, head of the Tartus Regional Customs Department, announced that the agreement with the Russian company to invest in the port of Tartus had been terminated. All revenues generated from the port’s activities would now be directed toward the interests of the Syrian state. In 2017, the Assad regime and a Russian company had signed an agreement extending Russia’s lease of the port for 49 years. Under this agreement, Russia was entitled to 65 percent of the port’s profits. Now, however, the new Syrian administration has nullified the agreement after eight years. Some sources suggest that the current leadership has demanded that the Kremlin withdraw its forces from Tartus immediately. Reports indicate that the Assad regime had signed an investment agreement with the Russian company Stroytransgaz to manage the port and invest over $500 million in its modernization. Despite this, work on restoring equipment that had previously gone unmodernized is expected to resume, but it remains unclear which country or company will take over this responsibility.

Decision bears the imprint of Turkey’s “signature”

Following the uprising led by Jolani in Idlib, which resulted in the ousting of Assad, Turkey became much more active in Syria. Official Ankara quickly emerged as the primary suspect behind this coup project. The support provided to the "Hayat Tahrir al-Sham" group by another opposition faction, the "Free Syrian Army," which is said to be backed by Turkey, as well as Erdogan’s well-wishes to Jolani’s forces before Assad’s fall, left little room for doubt about Turkey's involvement. After the coup, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan emphasized that Turkey opposes the presence of military bases in Syria—not only those of Russia but of any foreign country. Ankara has been vocal in its opposition to foreign military involvement in the Levant. However, Fidan added that the decision regarding the presence of foreign troops in Syria should ultimately reflect the will of the Syrian people and that any agreements or solutions reached must be respected by all parties involved. He also noted the ongoing withdrawal of Russian military units from their bases in Syria to the coast, alongside the increasing military presence of the United States in the region.

“We have just learned that the United States has more than 2,000 troops in Syria, which is twice the previously estimated number. People believed there were only 900 American troops there, but the Pentagon recently revealed the real figure,” Fidan said.

This new revelation comes after Pentagon spokesman Patrick Ryder clarified that there are approximately 2,000 U.S. troops stationed in Syria, as opposed to the 900 previously reported. Ryder explained that the 900 soldiers are part of the core U.S. military contingent, deployed for long-term operations, while the remaining personnel are temporary, rotating forces.

“Today, I learned that there are about 2,000 American soldiers in Syria, and as they explained to me, these additional forces are temporary rotating forces deployed to fulfill the mission’s objectives. The main contingent of American troops is 900, intended for long-term deployment,” said Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan.

Turkey's influence is increasingly evident in Syria's domestic and foreign policies. There are frequent reports of Turkish involvement in key areas such as the drafting of the new constitution, the formation of a new government, and the reorganization of the military. It is becoming more apparent that the new Syria is being shaped along the lines of the Turkish model. The actions and policies of the current Syrian government suggest this influence. For instance, shortly after Jolani came to power, the leaders of the previously designated terrorist group took significant steps to address issues like women's rights, the interests of ethnic minorities, and the protection of religious freedoms. Notably, they declared Christmas a holiday on New Year’s Eve. In essence, the visible changes in Syria seem to be rooted in Ankara’s influence.

Putin has not conceded defeat. Now what?

Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his annual "Straight Line" press conference on December 19, asserted that the fall of the Assad regime was not a defeat for Russia. He emphasized that Russia had entered Syria to eliminate terrorist groups and had achieved that objective. However, analysis suggests that behind Russia's ostensibly altruistic “assistance” in the fight against terrorism, there were more ambitious and strategic goals at play. Despite being burdened by sanctions and grappling with the economic fallout from its annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia had compelling reasons for deploying a large force to Syria in 2015. One of the key motives behind Putin’s support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime was to block any pipeline routes that could compete with Russia's gas supply to Europe and Turkey. The primary competitor in this regard was the proposed Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline. Russia’s involvement in the Syrian conflict and its support for a dictator aligned with the Kremlin in Damascus enabled it to prevent the construction of this pipeline, ensuring Gazprom's continued dominance in supplying gas to Europe. This strategy was particularly important because Assad had accused Qatar of backing the rebels fighting against his regime, leading to a significant deterioration in relations between Doha and Damascus. In this context, the Kremlin's intervention in Syria also served to thwart Western energy plans that could undermine Russia's influence in Europe.

Furthermore, Putin has gained a reputation for preserving the regimes of his allies. He is known for supporting autocratic leaders like himself. There are numerous examples of this. The Kremlin is particularly concerned whenever an authoritarian regime close to it is shaken, as such events can have a ripple effect. For instance, when his close ally, Muammar Qaddafi, was overthrown in Libya in 2011, Putin recognized that this change, occurring 7,000 kilometers away, could eventually impact Moscow. Later, the wave of protests in Russia, led by figures such as Boris Nemtsov and other opposition leaders, further confirmed that Putin's concerns were justified. In response, on September 30, 2015, after the commotion caused by Crimea’s annexation had subsided, Putin swiftly deployed Russian forces to Syria, starting to protect the Assad regime that he had long sought to preserve.

This was the set of plans that Putin and his allies had in Syria. However, calculating how much the Russian taxpayers had to pay for their implementation could require figures well into the 10-digit range. Although it's difficult, we will attempt to estimate the costs. Russia began its military intervention in Syria at Assad's request on September 30, 2015. By the end of October that year, initial figures began to emerge regarding the costs of this operation. At that time, Russia was spending around $4 million daily on military operations in Syria. This included air strikes, supplies, infrastructure, ground personnel, their motivation, and all other related expenses, amounting to $4 million per day. For example, according to IHS (Information Handling Service), each fighter jet costs $12,000 per hour to operate, while each helicopter costs $3,000 per hour. With bombing runs keeping planes in the air for an average of 90 minutes per day and jets flying for an hour a day, Russia was spending approximately $710,000 daily on air operations alone. Additionally, about $750,000 worth of ammunition was used every day. Supporting military personnel in Syria cost around $440,000 per day, while maintaining ships in the Mediterranean added another $200,000 to the daily total. Other overhead costs, including logistics, intelligence gathering, communications, and engineering, amounted to approximately $250,000 per day. All these expenses added up to a total of $2.4 million per day. However, IHS senior analyst Ben Mures noted that these figures were the bare minimum, and the actual cost could have been twice as high. The $2.4 million daily estimate did not account for the increased use of ground-based weapons, the large-scale bombing campaigns that began in the second week of Russian airstrikes, and the cruise missile strikes initiated on Putin’s birthday, October 7. Each Kalibr missile launched from Russia’s Caspian flotilla was reportedly priced at $1.2 million. Adding these additional costs would bring the daily total to an average of $4 million, as mentioned earlier. This continued to be Russia’s active involvement in the Syrian conflict until the end of 2016—457 days. If the daily costs and their consistency were accurate, Russia would have spent more than $1.8 billion in Syria over a year and a half. However, this only accounts for the period until the end of 2016, during the most active phase of the military intervention. In reality, Russia continued to carry out numerous operations in Syria in the years that followed.

The aforementioned were the Kremlin’s objectives in Syria, along with the funds spent under the guise of assisting Assad. Calculating how much Gazprom benefited from Putin’s efforts to keep Assad in power for another nine years and prevent the Qatar-Turkey gas pipeline is a complex task. However, today, the billions of dollars spent on these goals have proven worthless. They were consumed by the flames of the Jolani-led attack. Yet, Putin continues to assert that, despite the regime change in Syria, Russia has achieved its objectives. Throughout his nearly uninterrupted 25-year leadership, the Russian president has seldom encountered defeat and is not one to readily admit failure. However, the facts and the realities behind them are undeniable. The numbers and the current situation speak for themselves—Putin has failed Russia in Syria.