What is Italy seeking in Uzbekistan?

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni—representing a G7 nation and the head of government of the world’s eighth-largest economy—is arriving in Uzbekistan.

This visit continues a growing pattern of high-level exchanges with Italy, which has become Uzbekistan’s first strategic partner in Western Europe, its third most significant partner in the European Union, and its 11th globally.

The first Central Asia–Italy summit and Meloni’s planned visit to Uzbekistan were originally scheduled for late April of this year but were postponed due to the death of Pope Francis. During that period, Italy was focused on organizing the Pope’s funeral and hosting global political leaders arriving in Rome for the occasion.

Meloni’s visit to Uzbekistan and the Central Asia–Italy summit were delayed by about a month. Now, the long-anticipated visit is set to begin within hours.

According to the Uzbek presidential press service, this meeting follows the agreements reached during President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s official visit to Italy from June 7–9, 2023. It is timely to revisit what results and agreements were achieved during that historic trip. Italy, during that visit, formally became Uzbekistan’s first strategic partner in Western Europe. Over 40 agreements were signed, totaling 9 billion euros.

Therefore, the high-level talks to be held in Samarkand can rightly be seen as a continuation of the 2023 visit.

“The issues of further strengthening the Uzbek-Italian strategic partnership and expanding multifaceted cooperation will be considered. The promotion of innovative cooperation and humanitarian exchange projects will also be in the spotlight. In the end, it is planned to sign a package of bilateral agreements,” the official statement reads.

But what does Prime Minister Meloni seek from Uzbekistan—a country that has impressed Western Europe in recent years, offers a growing market of 37 million people, and maintains close ties with Afghanistan, a region that raises security concerns for many?

For context, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni will be in Uzbekistan on May 28–29 for negotiations and meetings in Samarkand. On May 30, she will travel to Kazakhstan for the first Central Asia–Italy summit. This marks Meloni’s second visit to Uzbekistan. Her first took place on July 31, 2024, when she made a brief stop in Tashkent following an official visit to Beijing. During that visit, she met with Uzbek Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov and conveyed greetings from President Mirziyoyev.

Over the past three years, high-level visits between Italy and Uzbekistan have become more frequent. The following sections will outline a timeline of these exchanges and explore how ties between Rome and Tashkent have been revitalized after a long period of dormancy.

Back-and-forth diplomacy continues

Diplomatic relations between Italy and Uzbekistan were established in 1992, marking 33 years of formal ties. However, a noticeable deepening of bilateral cooperation, particularly with one of Europe’s historical cultural centers, began in earnest in the second quarter of 2023. Since then, high-level exchanges between Rome and Tashkent have intensified significantly.

This new chapter began with the visit of Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto to Uzbekistan on April 26, 2023. Before concluding his series of meetings with President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Crosetto held talks with then–Defense Minister General Bakhodir Kurbanov and Abdulaziz Kamilov, Uzbekistan’s long-serving former foreign minister and current Special Representative of the President for Foreign Policy. The visit was widely viewed as a preparatory step ahead of President Mirziyoyev’s visit to Italy in June.

The Washington-based Jamestown Foundation noted the seniority of the Uzbek delegation received by Crosetto and emphasized the significance of the visit, particularly in terms of security and defense cooperation. Analysts highlighted that, despite being located in different regions, Uzbekistan and Italy share overlapping concerns in international security—from combating extremism and religious radicalism to addressing terrorism and other transnational threats.

Since then, exchanges between the two countries have continued without interruption. On July 8, 2023, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev made an official visit to Italy, where he held talks with Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni at the Chigi Palace in Rome. During this trip, he also met with Italian President Sergio Mattarella and Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani. The visit centered not only on strengthening economic ties but also advancing defense cooperation, which had been previously discussed in Tashkent.

A major highlight of the visit was the Uzbek-Italian Business Forum, where over 40 agreements worth a combined 9 billion euros were signed. In addition, Italy voiced its full support for Uzbekistan's accession to the World Trade Organization—clear signs of warming relations between Rome and Tashkent. Most notably, the visit culminated in the signing of a strategic partnership agreement, officially making Italy Uzbekistan’s first strategic partner in Western Europe.

The momentum continued with subsequent diplomatic engagements aimed at expanding this partnership. Less than five months after President Mirziyoyev's visit to Rome, Italian President Sergio Mattarella made a return visit to Uzbekistan. He was accompanied by his daughter, Laura Mattarella. From November 10, 2023, he spent three days in the country, visiting Tashkent, Samarkand, and Khiva. During this trip, negotiations focused on deepening the bilateral strategic partnership and cooperation across key sectors. Mattarella’s visit was historically significant, marking the first trip to Uzbekistan by an Italian head of state in more than two decades. By this time, bilateral trade had already seen a sharp increase—rising by 30% to reach \$379.2 million in the first nine months of 2023 alone.

Large market, new energy tributary, and security: Italy’s goals in Uzbekistan

Central Asia has long held strategic importance on the global chessboard. The region attracts major powers such as Russia, China, and the United States due to its export markets, cost-effective logistics, cheap labor, and geopolitical proximity to Afghanistan. While diplomatic ties with Central Asia existed previously, interest from the European Union intensified following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Seeking to reduce its reliance on Russian energy, the EU has been increasingly engaging the region through high-level meetings, summits, and the "1+5" Central Asia–EU dialogue format.

Within the EU, France and Italy have adopted parallel yet distinct policies toward Central Asia. Though their approaches share similarities, each country pursues its own strategic goals. Following the Trump administration’s pivot in foreign policy, trust between France and the U.S. diminished, prompting Paris to explore alternative partnerships and prioritize new energy sources—particularly uranium.

Italy, while aligned with France in broader EU policy, has maintained a separate course in the region, focusing more on energy diversification and defense cooperation. For Rome, Central Asia has become a vital component of its long-term energy security strategy. Italy has already developed strong ties with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan’s neighbor, and views Uzbekistan itself as a promising energy partner.

Uzbekistan ranks among the top CIS countries in terms of natural gas reserves, with volumes recently estimated at around 1.8 trillion cubic meters. Most of its gas exports are directed to China. The country also possesses about 2 billion tons of coal, while oil is primarily imported to satisfy domestic needs. Uranium, a strategically critical resource, stands apart in this context. Both Italy and France have expressed increasing interest in advancing joint energy projects in Central Asia in recent years.

Trade imbalance and market potential

In the current trade relationship, Uzbekistan is primarily an importer while Italy is a dominant exporter. Italy mainly imports knitwear, copper, cotton, and mineral raw materials from Uzbekistan. In contrast, Uzbekistan purchases industrial equipment, manufacturing lines, electric motors, household appliances, medical technology, and pharmaceuticals from Italy.

However, the trade imbalance is stark. According to "Trading Economics", in 2024, Uzbekistan’s exports to Italy reached nearly \$85 million, whereas imports from Italy amounted to approximately \$500 million—a sixfold difference. This indicates that Italy views Uzbekistan not just as a partner but as a significant and growing market for its products.

Uzbekistan's population, approaching 38 million, accounts for 45% of Central Asia’s total population. That translates to nearly half of the consumer market in the entire region—an attractive prospect for any export-oriented European economy looking to diversify its sales footprint.

Cooperation on Afghanistan

For Italy, Uzbekistan holds strategic value alongside Turkmenistan—home to one of the world's largest natural gas reserves—and Kazakhstan, a key defense partner. Uzbekistan's willingness to cooperate on issues related to Afghanistan further strengthens its role in Italy's regional policy.

In 2021, with support from Tashkent and neighboring countries, Italy successfully evacuated around 5,000 Afghan citizens from Kabul—one of the highest figures among European Union member states. The Termez logistics hub in southern Uzbekistan played a critical role in facilitating Italy’s humanitarian aid deliveries to Afghanistan.

“Italy supports Uzbekistan's initiative to establish an International Negotiation Group on Afghanistan within the framework of the United Nations. This initiative aims to unify the efforts of all concerned nations, formulate a common policy on human rights, socio-economic support, Afghanistan’s regional economic integration, and the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking,” said Shahnoza Kadyrova, chief researcher at the Institute for Strategic and Interregional Studies under the President of Uzbekistan.

Does the West trust Uzbekistan?

For Italy, partnerships with the Central Asian governments—particularly Tashkent and Astana—offer geopolitical advantages and economic diversification. Uzbekistan, often described as the "gateway" to Central Asia, plays a central role in the region due to its geopolitical importance, population size, and military capability. Tashkent’s pragmatic foreign policy in recent years has built a foundation of trust with its international counterparts.

A case in point is Uzbekistan’s position on the war in Ukraine. Despite being one of Russia’s two largest trading partners, the Uzbek government publicly declared in the Senate—through the Foreign Minister—that it does not recognize the breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, distancing itself from Moscow’s narrative.

Moreover, Tashkent has upheld a balanced policy toward Turkey. While Ankara has increased its efforts to present itself as a "big brother" to Turkic nations in Central Asia, Uzbekistan has signaled its independence by adhering to two United Nations resolutions: one rejecting the legitimacy of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and another refusing any form of cooperation with it. This demonstrates to Western partners that Uzbekistan is charting a sovereign and pragmatic course, focused solely on national interests.

This independent stance is likely one of the main reasons why countries like France and Italy—centrist powers within the European Union—have taken steps to deepen relations with Uzbekistan.

Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine has reshaped geopolitical realities across the post-Soviet space, especially in Central Asia. Many regional states are increasingly wary of Russian imperial ambitions. At the same time, Moscow’s faltering military performance in Ukraine has diminished its image as a reliable strategic partner. While ties with Russia remain too entrenched to be severed quickly, Central Asian governments are gradually reassessing their foreign policy alignments.

Still, it is unlikely that Italy or the EU would pursue military engagement in the region, given the limited scope of Europe’s defense commitments in Central Asia. Italy may, however, serve as a reliable partner in industrial cooperation and defense technology transfers.

One persistent challenge for Italy is geography: Central Asia remains dominated by stronger political actors such as Russia and China. Nevertheless, Russia’s increasingly unequal treatment of Uzbekistan—ranging from interference in internal affairs to condescending public rhetoric and diplomatic friction (as seen in the Lavrov–Saidov incident)—has cast doubt over the future of Moscow–Tashkent ties.

Meanwhile, China’s influence has also come under scrutiny. In a 2023 interview, the Chinese ambassador to France openly questioned the sovereignty of post-Soviet states—an alarming signal for countries like Uzbekistan. This has further motivated Tashkent to diversify its diplomatic partnerships and strengthen ties with the European Union, including Italy.

Today’s closeness between Italy and Uzbekistan

Ahead of the European Union–Central Asia summit held on April 3–4, 2025, the widely read Italian newspaper "La Repubblica" published an in-depth article about Uzbekistan. The piece emphasized the growing economic, cultural, and regional significance of Uzbekistan, highlighting it as a model of successful international cooperation with Italy. It underscored the steady development of economic, cultural, and humanitarian ties between the two nations.

According to "La Repubblica", trade turnover between Italy and Uzbekistan exceeded \$1.381 billion by the end of 2023—an increase of \$157.5 million compared to the previous year. The article noted that 54 joint ventures currently operate in Uzbekistan with Italian capital, including 35 fully Italian-owned enterprises. These companies are active in various sectors such as beverages, perfumery, textiles, and cotton processing.

Progress has also been made in the field of education. The mutual visits of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and President Sergio Mattarella have helped to strengthen academic and cultural relations. Several new agreements were signed to enhance student exchanges and launch joint educational initiatives. One symbolic cultural milestone was the presentation of the first Italian translation of the "Babur-Noma", held at the historic Strozzi Palace and the National Museum of Oriental Art in Florence.

Italy and Uzbekistan also play a key role in promoting the broader EU–Central Asia dialogue. Both countries are actively involved in advancing joint initiatives in agriculture, industry, and environmental protection. Another strategic area of cooperation is the development of the Trans-Caspian transport corridor. Italian entrepreneurs view this project as a vital link to overcome Uzbekistan’s geographic limitations as a landlocked country, and as an opportunity to enhance trade routes across the region.

Tourism is another promising area in bilateral relations. Italy—ranked fifth globally in terms of tourism potential—sees Uzbekistan, with its rich historical heritage and unique cultural landmarks, as an emerging destination in Central Asia. Italy welcomes an average of 60 million tourists annually, while Uzbekistan is aiming to attract 11 million visitors in 2024, up from more than 8 million the previous year.

This growth is significant: in 2017, Uzbekistan hosted just 2.5 million tourists. The fourfold increase over eight years reflects the country’s rising profile as a global tourism destination. However, challenges remain. Among the key barriers to further development are shortcomings in legislation, limitations in infrastructure, and occasional difficulties in hospitality services. Specific issues such as restrictions on drone usage for security reasons and poor road conditions continue to hinder tourism potential. Nonetheless, the trajectory of relations between Italy and Uzbekistan remains upward, driven by mutual interest, pragmatic cooperation, and a shared vision of regional development and global integration.