Territorial concessions to Russia: peace agreement or prelude to war?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has surpassed its 1,000-day mark, and the conflict shows no signs of abating. It has only intensified over the past summer and fall. Despite this, there are glimmers of hope that the nearly three-year-long invasion may be nearing its end. With Trump’s inauguration on the horizon, reports suggesting an imminent end to the invasion have become more frequent and serious. Speculation surged after U.S. President-elect Donald Trump visited France, where he met with President Macron and Ukrainian President Zelensky at the Élysée Palace.

However, while the potential end of the invasion is significant, the conditions under which it might end are of far greater importance. This issue is at the heart of the ongoing disagreement that prevents a resolution to the conflict. Russia’s stance on maintaining control over the territories it has occupied is unwavering, while Ukraine has consistently refused to compromise on territorial integrity since the beginning of the invasion. Presently, the possibility of Russia voluntarily returning to occupied Ukrainian territories seems remote.

The prospect of Trump’s return to power in the United States has only heightened concerns for Kyiv. There are fears that Trump may pressure Ukraine to concede its territories to Russia in an attempt to fulfill his promise of achieving peace shortly after taking office. Other possible solutions to end the conflict have been proposed, such as freezing the conflict along the current front lines and facilitating Ukraine’s entry into NATO, but these options are seen as highly unlikely.

For some major global actors, the idea of conceding Ukraine’s territories to Russia might seem like a swift and pragmatic solution. Reports have even circulated that, following Trump’s election victory, European leaders were cautioned to prepare for a scenario in which eastern Ukraine would be transferred to Russia. However, history offers a stern warning against this approach. Conceding land to an aggressive, expansionist state is a grave mistake that risks emboldening the aggressor—a lesson made clear by the events leading up to World War II.

Similar Scenarios: Today’s Putin and Yesterday’s Hitler

Adolf Hitler’s rise to power was a slow, arduous process. After over a decade of political struggle, he became Reich Chancellor in 1933, and following President Hindenburg’s death in 1934, Hitler assumed the role of Führer, consolidating absolute control. The Nazi Party’s racist and nationalist ideology enabled him to eliminate all internal opposition, both politically and militarily.

By 1936, Hitler’s ambitions had grown beyond Germany’s borders. Over the next three years, the German economy was militarized, with military spending increasing tenfold and the creation of Europe’s largest army. This rearmament was facilitated by a period of rapid economic growth in 1937-38, which revived Germany’s fortunes after the hyperinflation and devastation it faced following World War I.

Despite Germany’s growing military power, European powers adopted a policy of appeasement—seeking to avoid confrontation by making concessions to Hitler. This approach only emboldened him. His first target was Austria, which he annexed in March 1938 with minimal international resistance. The ease with which Hitler annexed Austria emboldened him further. His next target was the Sudetenland, a region of Czechoslovakia with a significant ethnic German population.

Unlike Austria, Czechoslovakia had strong allies, notably France and the Soviet Union. But this did not stop Hitler. By April 1938, he was discussing plans for the Sudetenland’s annexation with Wilhelm Keitel, head of the German Armed Forces. Hitler’s strategy was to justify his aggression by portraying himself as a liberator of ethnic Germans in Czechoslovakia. His rhetoric bears striking similarities to the justifications Russia’s Vladimir Putin has used for his invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, citing the need to "protect" Russian-speaking populations.

Munich Agreement: “Start” of World War II

By mid-1938, it was clear that Hitler intended to invade Czechoslovakia. As tensions mounted, Britain and France sought to avoid war at all costs. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain of Britain and French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier pursued a strategy of appeasement, aiming to satisfy Germany’s demands for the Sudetenland.

In London, Chamberlain and Daladier concluded that the best course of action was to pressure Czechoslovakia to relinquish the Sudetenland to Germany. France’s new government under Daladier made it clear that it would not honor its alliance with Czechoslovakia. French media, under government influence, argued that the 1924 Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty of Alliance did not obligate France to defend Czechoslovakia in this case.

On September 29, 1938, Hitler, Chamberlain, Daladier, and Italian dictator Benito Mussolini met in Munich. The resulting Munich Agreement granted Germany control of the Sudetenland. Under pressure from Britain and France, the Czechoslovak government had no choice but to comply. Chamberlain returned to Britain declaring that he had secured "peace with honor," but his political rival Winston Churchill harshly criticized him, warning, “You were given the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor, and you will have war.” Churchill’s words soon proved prophetic. By March 1939, Hitler’s forces had taken over the rest of Czechoslovakia. Six months later, in September 1939, Germany’s invasion of Poland triggered World War II.

Donbas for Putin = Sudetenland for Hitler

The lesson of the Munich Agreement is clear: granting territorial concessions to authoritarian aggressors only emboldens them to pursue further conquests. This historical lesson is highly relevant to today’s geopolitical landscape. Since 2008, Russia has engaged in a pattern of land grabs in post-Soviet states. The separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the ongoing occupation of eastern Ukraine all mirror Hitler’s moves in the late 1930s.

Both Hitler and Putin used similar justifications for their invasions. Hitler claimed to be uniting Germans in the Sudetenland with their homeland. Putin claims to be defending Russian speakers in the Donbas. The parallels are striking. Just as Hitler’s demands escalated after each successful annexation, so too have Putin’s ambitions grown after each military success. Both leaders relied on the complacency and appeasement of Western powers.

Today calls for Ukraine to concede its territories to Russia echo the logic of appeasement that underpinned the Munich Agreement. But history has already shown where this path leads. If Ukraine’s territories are ceded to Russia, it will not bring lasting peace. Instead, it will signal to Putin—and other authoritarian leaders—that aggression and territorial conquest yield tangible rewards. As history has proven, such concessions only pave the way for greater conflict.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has already upended the world order. If it ends with the transfer of Ukrainian territories to Russia, the world may once again face the prospect of a large-scale conflict. Emboldened by his victory, Putin—with an experienced military, a war-hardened economy, and access to allies willing to supply arms and soldiers—would have every incentive to pursue further conquests.

As the events of the 1930s and 1940s demonstrated, history repeats itself when its lessons are ignored. To avoid a repeat of the mistakes that led to World War II, world leaders must resist calls for territorial concessions and stand firm against aggression. Anything less risks igniting a larger, more destructive war in the future.