Is Turkey protecting al-Shara’s life?

There have been three assassination attempts on the life of Syrian interim president Ahmed al-Shara since he came to power. At first glance, such reports—mainly leaked by Israeli media outlets—may seem aimed at manipulating public sentiment in Syria. However, it has been exactly seven months since al-Shara arrived in Damascus and officially assumed office, during which time he has repeatedly faced both domestic and international political challenges. Initially, there were sharp and bloody clashes with the Alawite community loyal to the Assad family, followed by two major confrontations with the Druze Shiite minority. From the outset, it was evident that maintaining power in a religiously and ethnically fragmented country emerging from a 13-year civil war would be extremely difficult. This is the complex situation Ahmed al-Shara is currently navigating. Yet Erdogan—widely regarded as the main architect of Syria’s new political elite—has not remained silent throughout this process. There are enough signs that he is backing both the interim government and al-Shara himself, if not through military force, then through intelligence cooperation and public rhetoric. Today’s article explores the fragile peace in Syria’s border region with Israel, the persistent attempts on al-Shara’s life, and the suspected role of Turkey in ensuring his protection.

Is al-Shara’s elixir of life in Erdogan’s safe?

Israeli media, particularly the newspaper "Yedioth Ahronoth", have reported that there have been three assassination attempts on Syrian interim president Ahmed al-Shara in the past seven months. According to these accounts, the attempts were foiled thanks to the swift interventions of Turkish security services.

The first assassination attempt reportedly occurred near the Qasr al-Shab palace in Damascus. The quick response of Turkish intelligence services is said to have neutralized the threat on site.

The second attempt was allegedly planned near the Jordanian border, specifically in the city of Daraa. During al-Shara’s visit to the region, two suspects were identified nearby. Syrian and Turkish forces reportedly acted jointly to change the president’s planned route, thereby preventing an attack. This incident, like the first, was kept hidden from the public and remains classified.

The third—and reportedly most serious—attempt took the form of an armed ambush along the president’s regular route in Damascus. Once again, Turkish and Syrian intelligence agencies are believed to have uncovered the plan in advance and dismantled the operation before it could be carried out.

Israeli and Arab sources claim that Ahmed al-Shara ordered the incidents to be kept secret to prevent public panic and to deny his political opponents the opportunity to exploit the situation. So far, these reports remain unconfirmed by official sources. However, as previously noted, in Syria—long fractured under Bashar al-Assad—even during al-Shara’s leadership, certain tribes and ethnic groups with historical influence continue to resist central authority. Given this context, repeated attempts on his life are not entirely unexpected.

3 threats to the government

Ahmad al-Shara's life has reportedly faced three assassination attempts, but his government itself was directly threatened three times in just seven months. The first major threat occurred on March 6 of this year. Assad’s loyalists—who had fled to the coastal provinces of Tartus and Latakia—rose up against the new government. When they attacked security forces loyal to al-Shara, clashes erupted between the two sides. The fighting lasted five to six days, and more than a thousand people were killed. This could have seriously undermined the international reputation of Ahmad al-Shara, who had only been in power for three months at the time.

Shortly after, a second threat emerged, just as al-Shara completed his fifth month in office. The Druze—numbering about 700,000 across Syria—became the focal point of renewed tensions. Clashes broke out between the Druze and other local armed groups in late April and early May, resulting in dozens of deaths. The situation sparked protests in Israel, where over 143,000 Druze live, due to close ties between Jews and Druze communities. In response, Netanyahu—whose regime thrives on bloodshed—ordered the Israeli army to carry out “warning” airstrikes. On May 1, Israeli fighter jets bombed villages in Damascus, Hama, and Daraa, killing and injuring many. One of the strikes even targeted an area near the residence of Syrian interim President Ahmad al-Shara, a fact confirmed by Netanyahu himself, who said the attack was meant to “send a clear message to Syria” and protect Druze groups. However, the situation soon calmed and the rebellion was suppressed.

By mid-July, Syria under al-Shara’s leadership once again found itself on the brink of civil war. Tensions reignited between the same Druze and Bedouin groups, and once again Israel inserted itself into the conflict. This proved that Tel Aviv’s regime sees war and chaos not just as tools, but as necessities for its own survival. On July 16, Israeli warplanes bombed strategic locations in and around Damascus, including the General Staff headquarters and the Presidential Palace in the Abu Rummana district. The following day, they struck the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade base in Bzamil and the 107th Armored Brigade base in Jable. Nearly a thousand people were killed in the tribal clashes and Israeli airstrikes. Yet, as with previous crises, al-Shara was able to quell the unrest in less than a week. On July 19, he announced a ceasefire in southern Syria based on a peace plan developed with international mediators. However, after these latest Israeli interventions, Ahmad al-Shara drastically changed his stance toward Tel Aviv. Previously, he had emphasized that Syria had moved beyond war, and expressed hopes for peaceful development and even non-hostility toward Israel. But now, he outright condemned Netanyahu’s regime and its interference in Syria’s internal affairs. He sent a clear message: Syria is prepared for war.

It’s worth noting that no other Middle Eastern leader today possesses as much combat experience as Ahmad al-Shara. He and his inner circle—comprising at least 50,000 loyal fighters—have nearly two decades of battlefield experience. Although at times they were labeled as terrorists and at others as anti-Assad militants, perceptions of al-Shara shifted rapidly after his rise to power. When the world learned about Syria’s mass graves and the horrors of the Saydnaya prison—comparable to Nazi concentration camps—Western powers swiftly reevaluated their stance. Al-Shara’s legitimacy grew almost overnight. International organizations, European powers, and global institutions rushed to Damascus, offering support on the condition that he restore human rights and form an inclusive government—both of which had suffered under Assad.

Al-Shara acted on these recommendations. He shut down Saydnaya prison, exposed the mass graves, and ended extrajudicial killings. These steps enhanced his image both domestically and internationally. As a result, countries like the US and EU began gradually lifting sanctions on Syria. He also pursued a bold diplomatic agenda—first visiting neighboring Middle Eastern states, then traveling to France. In just five to six months, al-Shara held meetings that would be the envy of any world leader. He met Erdogan, Trump, Macron—practically every major player except Xi Jinping. Diplomats flocked to Damascus, but it was the Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit that stood out. He was received not just formally, but as a trusted guest and close ally—an unmistakable sign that Turkey had become the new Syrian leadership’s primary partner and backer.

Is it time to ask Turkey for help?

Reports are circulating that Ankara is preparing to provide concrete support to Syria in forming a military force of at least 300,000 troops. Several Turkish media outlets have covered this development. It was expected that Al-Shara’s visit to Turkey would lead to the signing of a significant military cooperation agreement with President Erdogan. Although the outcomes of the visit have not been officially disclosed by either side, media reports suggest that Turkey may establish several military bases within Syrian territory.

While there is still no clear evidence of deep military cooperation between Turkey and Syria, recent claims that Turkish intelligence services helped prevent assassination attempts on Al-Shara indicate that Turkey is already actively engaged in Syria’s sensitive political processes. Moreover, Turkish state broadcaster TRT Haber recently reported that Syrian authorities officially requested Turkey's assistance to enhance their defense capabilities and combat terrorism, especially in light of rising tensions with the Druze and Israeli military interventions. The report also noted that the Turkish Ministry of Defense has expressed continued support for Syria.

Back in December, Erdogan made headlines when he was the first to voice support for a figure named Jolani, who left Idlib, advanced into Aleppo, captured Hama, Homs, and other regions, and marched toward Damascus. This unexpected statement shocked the global community. It soon became clear that Erdogan was orchestrating these developments. While Putin referred to him as the primary beneficiary of the situation in Syria, Trump stated that "the keys to Syria are in Erdogan’s hands." At the time, some political analysts criticized Erdogan for backing a former terrorist, warning that this move could have dangerous consequences in the future. Now, a fundamental question arises: Which is the better option — the Assad regime, which has ruled with a bloody iron fist for decades, used chemical weapons against its own people, severed diplomatic ties with both the world and its Arab neighbors, and left behind horrific legacies like the Saydnaya prison and countless mass graves — or Ahmed al-Shara, who may have a controversial past but is now working to correct the mistakes of the previous regime, gradually reintegrate Syria into the international community, and even seek peaceful relations with historically hostile powers like Israel? This question doesn’t intend to absolve Al-Shara of his past actions, especially those in Idlib, nor has his legal status been formally assessed. It is the responsibility of international and domestic legal authorities to evaluate his political and military record. What we can discuss, however, is which of the two options appears to be the lesser evil — or the more promising path — from a political standpoint.

Ten years ago, on September 2, 2015, the image of 3-year-old Alan Kurdi’s lifeless body washed ashore in Bodrum, Turkey, shook the world. His tragic fate became a symbol of the Syrian crisis, and the pain of that moment remains fresh for many. Over the past 15 years, countless Syrians have suffered similarly, caught between the brutality of ISIS and the repression of the Assad regime. In this context, if Syria is genuinely seeking to prevent future Alan Kurdi tragedies and is trying to normalize relations with the world without posing a threat to others, then perhaps it's too early to judge Al-Shara’s rise to power under Erdogan’s guidance. Only time — and likely several years — will tell whether Turkey's involvement and Syria’s political transformation will prove successful or not.