Losing Damascus: Iran’s strategic withdrawal from Syria

Iran, which for many years held influence in the Syrian government and on its territory equal to that of official Damascus, perceived the fall of the Assad regime as a huge loss. It did not establish any relations with the country’s new leader, Ahmed al-Shara, and relations between the two remain in this stagnant state. Tehran was especially openly dissatisfied with Ankara, which it saw as the main beneficiary of the events in Syria following these changes. However, developments in Damascus continued to unfold in a way that contradicted Iranian goals. Shara consolidated his power over the past months. Meanwhile, another major player in Syria, Russia, also resigned itself to this new reality. The Kremlin sought to establish relations with the new leadership in Damascus, collaborate with it, and even maintain its military and strategic presence in the country. Moscow aimed to align with the new government in this regard. Even during the annual “Direct Line” conference, Putin noted that terrorists had not come to power in Syria, explicitly referring to Assad’s rule as a regime. Naturally, Tehran, observing these changes, is beginning to understand that there is no point in swimming against the current. It has no choice but to adapt to the prevailing trend. Syria today is not the Syria of five months ago. The country is now under an entirely different administration and new partners, guided by powerful backers. However, it took official Tehran a long time to adjust to this. Today, Iranian leaders have finally begun to "digest" the new realities in Syria. As evidence of this, on April 19, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi announced that Tehran is not opposed to the current Syrian government and is ready to help it form an inclusive government if necessary. Araqchi also noted that Iran has not yet established any contacts with the current Syrian representatives, adding that it remains concerned about the situation in the country and is interested in ensuring security and stability there.

So, what advantages has Iran had in Syria so far? How important was this place for them? This analytical material will describe in detail Iran's long-standing "adventures" in Syria.

Turning Syria into a backyard

Looking at a map of the Middle East, it is difficult to find a country that can match Syria in terms of its strategic geographical location and major transport routes. With its coastline on the Mediterranean Sea, borders with five regional countries, and its status as a key logistics hub, Syria has long been an attractive arena for geopolitical games. Among the Arab countries in the Middle East, only Saudi Arabia can somewhat rival Syria in terms of these advantages—no other country has such an opportunity. Yet, geography alone does not guarantee good fortune for a state, as Syria’s case demonstrates. Once one of the main centers of Eastern civilization, Syria has become a real "tatami" for external forces precisely because of its location.

The unrest that spread throughout the region 15 years ago—the “Arab Spring”—subsided in most countries within a certain period. But Libya and Syria were exceptions. In Syria, due to the Assad regime’s missteps, the Arab Spring evolved into one of the longest civil wars in modern history. External powers began to exploit the chaos for their own agendas. Iran was among those who saw opportunity in Syria, following the maxim: “where there is chaos, there is profit.” Yet the diversity of strategies and goals among the foreign actors in Syria was striking. This led to the country’s fragmentation amid civil war. Turkey and the West tried to overthrow Assad, who had massacred his own citizens. Iran and Russia, which joined the conflict later, took the opposite path—choosing to preserve Assad. Several reasons may have driven this decision. While their shared authoritarian tendencies played a role, more specific motives existed. Russia aimed to maintain ties with the son of its old partner, Hafez Assad, and, through this relationship, secure its military base in Tartus and block the Turkey-Qatar gas pipeline project with the help of Assad, who opposed both countries. Iran, on the other hand, saw Assad’s survival as vital for its regional interests. The Assad family’s affiliation with the Shiite Alawite sect allied seem promising. Iran spared no expense—financial or military—in keeping Assad in power. It engaged in everything from security and intelligence operations to mentoring the Syrian military. Tehran deployed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ground forces, the Quds Force, intelligence services, and law enforcement to support Assad.

The aim was singular: to pursue its interests across the region through unfettered movement in Syria, a country in a highly strategic location. These interests included supplying its network of proxy groups across the Middle East that rely on Tehran and using Syrian territory as a corridor for moving military personnel. A glance at a Middle East map shows Syria borders both Iraq and Lebanon, countries where Iran has substantial military influence. After Saddam Hussein’s fall, Iran deepened its grip on Iraq through political parties and armed groups. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is Tehran’s linchpin in the governing structure. Located in southern Lebanon near Israel’s border, Hezbollah plays a central role in confronting Iran’s arch-enemy, Israel. Syria offers a convenient route for logistical support to Hezbollah. Additionally, Iran’s military footprint in Syria proved its capability to conduct cross-border operations. In short, Syria provided Iran with the breathing room it needed in the Middle East. Tehran, therefore, launched its operation to make Syria its backyard.

Acting as a “lid” for Assad

When Assad began losing control over Syria in the early stages of the civil war, Iran ramped up its military involvement. Initially, Lebanese Hezbollah took on a direct combat role, supplying Assad with seasoned fighters. Shiite groups from Iraq also joined the fight in Assad’s favor. At first, Iran denied involvement, despite ample evidence. Later, it acknowledged its presence under the slogan “defenders of the shrine,” claiming to protect the Shiite holy site of Sayyida Zaynab in Damascus. But few believed this religious justification. It was clear that Iran’s deep penetration into Syria was driven by strategic calculations.

Tens of thousands of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps personnel, more than 5,000 army soldiers, about 2,000 Quds Force officers, and tens of thousands of Iran-backed Shiite fighters were deployed to stabilize Syria. Their numbers fluctuated, but Iran’s presence and influence remained visible for many years. Its military footprint and support for Assad grew steadily. This support intensified from 2014, reaching its peak between 2015 and 2018. Iran’s costs also rose. Between November 2012 and 2017, Iran lost over 2,100 fighters, including 418 senior officers. More than 7,000 were wounded. Deaths among Lebanese, Iraqi, Afghan, and Pakistani recruits exceeded 1,000. Iran’s operations included ballistic missiles and drone strikes. By October 2018, Iranian drones had conducted more than 700 strikes on ISIS.

As of 2023, Iran had 55 military bases and 515 other military sites in Syria, mainly around Aleppo and Damascus—over 70% of active military zones. But like all things, Iran’s involvement had a lifespan. In December 2024, the dramatic rise of then-Jolani, now President Ahmed al-Shara, ended not only Assad’s reign but also Iran’s presence. Tehran withdrew. Even at the end, it failed to ensure a proper exit for its forces. Putin’s “Direct Line” program confirmed that Russia had withdrawn 4,000 pro-Iranian fighters from Syria.

Turning Syria into a “military camp”

Iran’s presence in Syria far exceeded Russia’s in scope. While Russia had geopolitical and military goals, Iran viewed Syria as a core battleground for ideological and strategic dominance. It developed a multi-pronged strategy. Militarily, Iran entrenched itself deeply. It infiltrated the Syrian army and security forces. Assad handed key institutions to Iran, legitimizing its presence in exchange for protection against Israeli and U.S. airstrikes.

Iran’s role extended beyond military matters to security, social, and economic spheres. Iran helped form a protective barrier for Assad through militia systems. It mobilized the local Shiite minority and recruited Sunnis from Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor. These fighters underwent six months of weapons training. Local militias included the National Defense Forces (formed in Homs in 2012), Local Defense Forces from Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, and Ar-Raqqa, and special Shiite units from northern Homs and parts of Ar-Raqqa.

Tehran also mobilized foreign militias from Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Lebanon. However, salary disparities were large. Foreign fighters earned up to $700 per month, while local fighters from places like Nubl and Zahra received under $100. Salaries were paid from the IRGC’s $8 billion budget.

As the war dragged on, militias were gradually replaced by private military companies. In 2013, Syria had fewer than 10 such companies. Their numbers surged as they were legalized to provide non-government-controlled armed forces for partners like Iran and Russia. These companies operated independently of Assad’s military, allowing Iran to expand its influence—especially in Damascus.

Encircling Syria

Iran’s efforts in Syria were not limited to military or security activities. It aimed to embed itself within Syrian society and the economy. Since 2017, Iran focused on connecting with Syrian businessmen. The Syria-Iran Business Forum, reactivated in 2018, helped expand Iranian economic projects—particularly in energy. Iran’s influence stretched across the military, security, economy, and social sectors, especially in Damascus, Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, and Homs. Iran also used charitable organizations to build goodwill. The most notable, Jihad Al-Bina, rebuilt schools and clinics and remains active in Deir ez-Zor and Aleppo.

After military operations slowed, Iran began combining armed and unarmed strategies. Dozens of Iranian cultural centers and educational institutions were established. Jihad Al-Bina alone rebuilt 16 schools in Deir ez-Zor in 2019. It distributed food and medical supplies during the COVID-19 pandemic, using funds from Iranian taxpayers and oil revenues.

Clearly, Iran aimed to secure long-term influence in Syria, keeping Assad in power. From military presence to social and demographic engineering, Iran’s reach was comprehensive. It even brought in foreign Shiite settlers and families of IRGC soldiers to increase demographic control. Reports indicate that Tehran had begun preparing for the post-Assad era, aiming to ensure its ideological legacy survived through ties with Assad’s Alawites. Notably, it was this Alawite community that was at the center of the first major violent incident after Ahmed al-Shara came to power.